2025-09-22
if you had seen the bull's swimming attempts you would have stayed away
PSmith review of Class explains why I still read the LRB despite a complete lack of identification to anything that they write1.
Jacob Falkovich argues that dating apps have not really gotten worse, but the problem is that the best users of dating apps have all gotten married, an interesting case where reverse-network effects means that the early adopters actually get a better experience than mass market consumers. Magdalene Taylor had an article recently about how there are so many niche dating apps coming out nowadays; according to this thesis, it implies that the optimal user strategy is to churn through all of them quickly before they ever take off.
Previously, I’ve argued that the “loneliness epidemic” is actually because historically there has been more extrinsic rather than intrinsic desire for human connection, and as technology has advanced that extrinsic need has steadily decreased2. In response, I presume that intrinsic desire will strengthen over time due to selection effects. On that note, there’s an interesting thread in /r/slatestarcodex asking what the purpose of more humans would be in an ASI future, stating that “all morality is based on rational self-interest”. On that note, there’s an interesting piece by Florence Bacus on to what extent people have moral duties towards others who do not have reciprocal duties, although unfortunately it only speaks of the implications of such reciprocity and not the argument itself.
Alice Maz reviews Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers on Yan Xuetong’s Xunzi-inspired view of international relations. The emphasis on leadership over institutions is very interesting in light of current developments in the United States, given how much political rhetoric is explicitly about the ability of institutions to hold society together3. Declining trust in institutions seems to be validating the argument that “with the gentleman present, even if the rules are sketchy, they are enough to be comprehensive. Without the gentleman, even if the rules are complete, one will fail to apply them in the right order”. Still, it seems to be writing them off excessively, because without those institutions, the west would certainly be doing far worse than it is, and it’s also true that a perpetual weakness in Chinese political philosophy is that the ruler is not always virtuous. Anyway, also highlighted is a quadrant framework for how great powers exert influence, which is interesting because it provides an explanation for why China lacks global influence despite it’s many qualifications to do so: because it cannot provide a governing framework which other countries can credibly copy. Actually, they will often explicitly describe the Chinese model as one that cannot be copied, as a counterpoint to the “strings-attached” approach of western NGOs, but also perhaps because they don’t want to be responsible for any failed implementations, nor would they like any successful implementations to become too successful and therefore start competing with them. The other alternative is the dream of the Chinese liberal, to become a better version of the United States, but even if this were politically feasible, for now it still can only run an inferior version of the US playbook, and therefore would turn itself into a follower rather than a leader. The ironic thing is within the quadrant framework, the two good outcomes of humane authority and hegemony actually imply liberalism at the national level; the former because that’s the only model which has historically worked globally between countries; the latter because relations based on pragmatism imply leaving your allies to do as they wish within their own domains. Thus, the US could probably continue to decline even further and still lead the world, all the way until the countries of the world feel that the liberty enabled by China is superior to that offered by the US. Plausibly, this is one of the reasons why Chinese intellectuals generally prefer to use a more strictly IR approach to geopolitics. The last thing to note is that it’s unclear to me to what extent a fusion of Chinese and American ideology can truly lead the world, because if one looks at Chinese Americans, they don’t seem to be able to fight for position; they are notoriously underrepresented in any positions of leadership. The fusion which actually successfully takes power is the one between India and America, to the extent that it's already causing backlash, even before India the country can do anything about it.
Alastair Marsh (via Kyle Chan) in Bloomberg argues that Chinese manufacturers are so ahead in sectors like batteries and solar that these sectors are now uninvestable outside of China. It’s an interesting data point given all the pieces about involution recently: and how it might actually be a very good strategy to price your product far below what you the market is willing to pay, if it means that no one else can enter your sector and turn you into a commodity. On the other hand, if that means everyone else stops trying to the extent that the surrounding infrastructure completely decays and renders the threat of competition even weaker, then it’s possible that the steady decline in solar prices we’ve seen over the last couple of decades could end up slowing or even reversing, which in this particular case would be rather unfortunate.
Autodidacts notes that quantity as a means for improvement only works if you are receiving and incorporating some form of feedback at the end of each iteration.
Byrne Hobart puzzles over why big tech doesn’t seem to be getting disrupted with the rise of AI. Personally, I think the simple answer is just that disruption doesn’t happen to you if you are good, and the software industry has been unprecedentedly successful at getting people who are good over the past decade.
Human Progress linkthread. On that note, Hannah Ritchie has an interesting article on how both yields and total production of staple crops are on track for a record high.
Although these days, to be category X one reads DeepLeft Analysis.
Hence, people looking for more ways to claim that we actually need each other more than we thought, as in this Asterisk Mag piece by Oshan Jarow on how tripping is better with others.
Even theories explaining the rise of authoritarian leaders treats institutions as their origin, as in this case, where Dan Moynihan traces out current circumstances to the rise of Unitary Executive Theory as a response to the growing administrative bureaucracy.